No more M23. The end of an era? And what’s next?

Posted by ethuin on November 5, 2013 · 5 Comments 

Few hours after the first rumours (initial public source seems to have been North Kivu governor Julien Paluku) announced the capture of Runyoni and Cyanzu by UN-backed FARDC troops (Mbuzi, the third hill under M23 control during the last week has been taken some 24-48 hours before). On November 5 early in the morning, the remaining M23 forces reportedly left their positions and fled. Unconfirmed accounts indicate the movements’ senior command has dispersed to both Uganda and Rwanda, while rank-and-file soldiers surrendered to FARDC or went into hide. The phone contacts of various senior commanders, including Sultani Makenga, have been off since November 4 late afternoon.

The rebel movement’s political leadership, after having announced a unilateral ceasefire before, issued a statement officially ending M23’s existence as an armed opposition movement in eastern Congo (see twitter screenshot). In social media, the military branch of the movement has defied rumours of complete disband among the rebel’s armed wing.

On the validity of these announcements, no final judgement is possible at this time while it seems likely that big parts of the remaining few hundred combatants either left DRC territory, surrendered to FARDC, or dispersed into the Virunga forests.

Overall, a few things can be said, while a bunch of questions remain open.

The military end of M23 may well signify the final stage of what has been an ‘era of armed movements’ in eastern Congo. Particularly in terms of personnel, the continuity from AFDL, RCD-Goma, CNDP, and M23 is striking. Sultani Makenga, the movement’s commander for instance has been part of all these rebellions.  Similar for others, such as Vianney Kazarama, Yusuf Mboneza, Innocent Kayina etc. (some of them may not have been part of AFDL and temporarily in other groups such as UPC or PARECO, but in gross this is it).

This does not mean, however, that underlying problems are solved. Despite observable improvements of FARDC capacity to conduct operations and increased willingness of MONUSCO under Kobler and dos Santos Cruz to actually weigh in through its Force Intervention Brigade (as Darren Olivier well described) the root causes and grievances may be left unaddressed again, if a political agreement does not add up to what happened on the battleground.

As it is the case with numerous other communities in eastern Congo, the so-called ‘Congolese Tutsi’ of North Kivu (more precisely, big chunks of the Banyabwisha, Banyajomba, and others) need to be given political and social representation. The same applies to others, obviously. As long as land and citizenship issues are not taken seriously a ‘new M23/CNDP’ remains possible, even if the genealogy of leadership seems to be broken from today.

More so, DDR – with a particular focus on reintegration – is urgently needed, not only for M23 but also other Congolese armed groups (see the various Usalama Project reports) and in the form of DDRRR. While the latter is currently carried out by MONUSCO and working not that bad despite inherent challenges, the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of Congolese combatants has been stalled for years after massive failures had marred to previously government-led and internationally-sponsored programmes.

As a third point, it is now more crucial than ever, that both FARDC and MONUSCO (through the FIB) also engage with other groups, in particular FDLR as the most longstanding threat to civilians, in order to keep power imbalances that may result in the emergence of local security dilemmas as small as possible. In addition, MONUSCO needs to rethink its ‘islands of stability’ idea that may possibly turn into a ‘swamps of instability’-reality if cleared areas are not sufficiently covered by either blue helmets or responsibly acting FARDC units.

The Congolese government, most visibly represented by its spokesperson Lambert Mende, has announced a landslide victory over the M23 which has been humiliating the Kabila government and the country’s armed forces not even a year ago by taking Goma. Mende announced FARDC would now take on all other armed groups (based on various mapping exercises I did, we speak about 50-60, grossly). Officially, the government has committed to a continuation of the Kampala Talks such as demanded by M23’s political leadership around Bisimwa and Abandi. In Kinshasa however, billboards hailing the victory of President Kabila and the FARDC, as well as (probably government-sponsored) women’s marches tell a different mood.

On its side, MONUSCO saluted M23’s defeat, or capitulation, and underlined its responsibility of neutralising all negative forces in the area. While it is too early to predict the Force Intervention Brigade’s future actions, most observers have identified FDLR, Mayi Mayi Sheka (NDC), and the Allied Democratic Forces as potential next targets. Cognisant of the huge expectations, yet now as the FIB eventually turns out as an effective instrument, MONUSCO’s leadership around Kobler seems wary of not exaggerating verbal warfare. While the UN appears as determined as rarely before quick immediate action against other armed groups should not be expected either.

Tracking and tackling other armed groups in eastern DRC is going to be an amazing task for both government forces and blue helmets. Despite a surprisingly swift success over M23, observers cast doubts on whether the FARDC-MONUSCO coalition will be able to similarly live up to expectations when it comes to less centralised and structured militias. In their fight against M23, sniper and helicopter attacks on semi-open terrain (the hills around Rumangabo and Rutshuru are not completely tree-covered) were among the keys to success and steady supply routes from Goma and elsewhere have also helped the advance.

This will not be the case for FDLR. Most of the ex-interahamwe group are scattered below large panoplies, divided into a North Kivu (in northern Masisi/Lubero) and South Kivu (south Mwenga) command plus small splinter groups RUD and Soki (most likely both in Lubero/Rutshuru). After Umoja Wetu and Kimia II joint operations against FDLR, the latter’s combatants have been decimated, pushed deeper into the hinterland and forced to learn more decentralised militia tactics. A similar example is the FDLR’s largest current threat, Raia Mutomboki. A widespread semi-structured franchise of numerous militias, Raia Mutomboki mostly consists of part-time combatants that spend most of the time as civilians cultivating fields in Shabunda, Kalehe, or Mwenga.

Military operations against such kind of actors need to take into account those specialties and adapt in tactics and equipment. It is yet to become clear whether MONUSCO is that flexible and FARDC is that capable. It should not be forgotten that FARDC’s landslide victory is also based on the fact that 1) command structures around Col. Ndala and Gen. Bahuma have been considerably streamlined, 2) some of the best assault units of the army have been used, and 3) these units have been properly paid and supplied as well.

From a cross-border perspective, both Uganda and Rwanda have been extraordinary quiet in terms of comments and statements. A few days earlier, senior figures in Kampala and Kigali had been accusing FARDC of deliberately shelling into their territories (similar to earlier bombing of Gisenyi and its surroundings, there has never been a final confirmation who launched the shells – both M23 and FARDC may have done so). While reactions have been announced should bombings continue, this item now seems to be closed given the battle ended on November 5 early in the morning.